Abstract. In this paper, first we discuss the security model for deterministic challenge-response identification protocols. For such protocols, we are able to simplify the CR2 security model in [2] which captures concurrent attacks and reset attacks. Then we propose an extremely simple identification protocol and prove that its CR2 security is equivalent to the hardness of the Strong Diffie-Hellman problem.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the simplified CR2 model. In Section 3, we present the new identification protocol and its security proof. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Security model for identification protocols
Model for general identification protocols
In [3] , Bellare et al. defined a formal security model for identification protocols. The model captures concurrent attacks, where an adversary can concurrently execute identification protocols with multiple provers while he impersonates a prover to a verifier, and reset attacks, where an adversary can reset a prover to its previous state. The model is named CR2 (concurrent-reset 2). A weaker model is named CR1, where an adversary can concurrently execute identification protocols with multiple provers only before he impersonates a prover to a verifier.
The CR2 model consists of a description of an identification protocol and a security game that defines the security of the protocol. An identification protocol is described by a function ID() which specifies how all associated processes (key generation, message computation, session id or decision computation) are implemented. The first argument to ID() is a keyword (keygen for key generation, prvmsg for prover message computation, vfmsg for verifier message computation, prvsid for prover session id computation, vfend for verifier end message and session id computation) which invokes the subroutine responsible for that function on the other arguments. The protocol consists of m(k) moves where k is a security parameter and m() is a polynomial. The value m(k) is odd so that the first and last moves belong to the prover. When it is necessary, a START message is added for the prover.
The security game of the CR2 model is defined in Game 1 (this is the same game as defined in Figure 3 , [3] ). The game gives the adversary access to multiple prover instance oracles and a single verifier oracle. Each game begins with some initializations, including choosing the keys. Then the adversary makes queries to the prover oracles and the verifier oracle. A WakeNewProver query activates a new prover instance p by picking a random tape R p for it. A Send(prvmsg, i, x) query results in the prover i returning the next prover message computed as ID(prvmsg, sk, x; R i ). Resetting is captured by allowing any valid conversation prefix x to be queried. Concurrency is captured by the fact that any activated prover instance can be queried. A Send(vfmsg, x) query invokes the verifier to return either the next verifier message computed as ID(vfmsg, pk, x; R V ) (when the verifier still has a move to make) or the decision computed as ID(vfend, pk, x; RV ) (when x corresponds to a full conversation). Unlike a prover instance, resetting the verifier instance is not allowed. This is enforced explicitly in the game via the verifier message counter C V . For more detailed explanation of the game, see [3] .
Execution of protocol ID with adversaryÂ and security parameter k in the CR2 setting Initialization: 
A wins the game if either of the following is true: A wins the game if the following is true: 1. decision = accept and sid V / ∈ SID Game 3: CR2 for challenge-response identification protocols with deterministic prover.
Model for two-move protocol with deterministic prover
We make the following changes to adapt the CR2 model for two-move identification protocols with a deterministic prover.
(1) Change the condition forÂ to win.Â wins only when decision = accept and
In the CR2 model,Â wins ifÂ makes the verifier accept without simply relaying messages between the verifier and a prover (this condition is captured by condition 1, decision = accept and sid V / ∈ SID 1 ∪ · · · ∪ SID p ), or ifÂ makes two prover instances output the same sid (this condition is captured by condition 2, there exist 1 ≤ a < b ≤ p with SID a ∩ SID b = ∅). We note that condition 2 is not essential for the security of an identification protocol because no verifier is cheated here. In addition, condition 2 makes some identification protocols without known flaws insecure in CR2, e.g., the signature based challenge-response protocol in Section 3 of [3] . We consider condition 2 to be too strong a condition and drop this condition to simplify the model.
(2) Change the description of the protocol from odd-number of moves to two moves.
This change is straightforward. With this change, for each prover instance i, A will only make query Send(prvmsg, i, x; R i ) once, with x = msg 1 ; for the verifier,Â will make query Send(vfmsg, x) twice, the first time with x = ⊥ and the second time with x = msg 1 msg 2 . Note that the use of the message counter C V ensures thatÂ must query Send(vfmsg, ⊥) before querying Send(vfmsg, msg 1 msg 2 ). The resulting game is described in Game 2.
(3) Change the game for a deterministic prover.
Since the prover is deterministic, the random tapes R i for prover instance i can be removed. Then the sets SID i can be merged into one set SID, and the prover instance indicator i and related operations can be removed. The resulting game is described in Game 3.
In Game 3, query Send(vfmsg, msg 1 ) must be made after the query Send(vfmsg). Query Send(prvmsg, i, msg 1 ) can be before or after Send(vfmsg), and it can be made a polynomial (in k) number of times. Send(vfmsg, msg 1 ) is the last query. Game 3 can be rewritten into an interactive game described in Game 4. In Game 4, n 1 and n 2 are polynomials (in k) chosen byÂ. We specify that, in the identification protocol, sid = msg 1 msg 2 and sid V = msg 1 msg 2 (This specification is only for the security proof and does not have to be included in the protocol itself). Since msg 2 ← ID(prvmsg, sk, msg 1 ), the same msg 1 values result in the same msg 2 values, and hence the same sid values. Therefore, sid V / ∈ SID in Game 3 is equivalent to c = c i in Game 4.
We then rewrite Game 4 to Game 5, where n is a polynomial (in k) chosen byÂ. It can be shown that the probabilities that A can win in Game 4 and Game 5 are identical. A proof sketch is as follows:
(1) Suppose thatÂ can win Game 4. Then, in Game 5,Â chooses n = n 1 + n 2 and ignores c for the first n 1 queries, generating challenges as in game Game 4. For the last n 2 queries,Â also generates challenges as in Game 4, but now these challenges may depend on c. In this case, Game 5 is the same as Game 4 forÂ. SinceÂ can win Game 4, it can win Game 5.
(2) Suppose thatÂ can win Game 5. Then, in Game 4,Â chooses n 2 = n and n 1 = 0. In this case, Game 4 is the same as Game 5 forÂ. SinceÂ can win Game 5, it can win Game 4.
Therefore, Game 5 is a security definition equivalent to the CR2 game (with a modification on the conditions that A wins) for challenge-response identification protocols with deterministic provers, and we define that the protocol is secure against concurrent attacks and reset attacks if the probability that the adversary wins Game 5 is negligible 1 . We give an intuitive explanation why Game 5 captures concurrent attacks and reset attacks for challenge-response identification protocols with deterministic provers. Since the prover's response is only determined by the current challenge, it is stateless. Therefore, a reset operation does not affect the prover's behaviour, and concurrent execution of the protocol is equivalent to sequential execution of the protocol. Initial setup. The initial setup for our scheme is described in Figure 1 . We assume the existence of a trusted authority, denoted by T A, who will issue certificates for all potential participants in the scheme. Observe that the setup of the scheme is defined in terms of security parameters k and k. We would probably take k = 1024 and k = 160 in practice.
Input. Security parameters k and k , which are positive integers. The parameter k should be polynomial in k.
1.
The T A chooses a large prime p such that p − 1 is divisible by another large prime q, where log 2 p ≈ k , log 2 q ≈ k, and k is polynomial in k.
2.
The T A chooses an element g ∈ Z * p having order q.
3.
The T A publishes the triple (p, q, g).
4.
The T A publishes a hash function h : Z * p → {0, 1} k .
5.
Each proverP chooses a private key a uniformly at random from Z q , computes the public key v = g a mod p, and sends v to the T A. T A verifies thatP does possess the private key corresponding to v, and issues a certificate toP certifying that v is indeedP 's public key. Protocol description. In a session of the scheme, the proverP tries to convince the verifierV of its identity.V "accepts" only ifP responds toV 's challenge in an appropriate way. The steps in a session of our scheme are summarized in Figure 2 .
In the following, we omit the operation "mod p" to simplify the notation. The message flows can be depicted as follows:
Remark. The protocol may have been used in practice. However, to the best of our knowledge, it has not been formally presented or analyzed in the literature. Although resembling some other schemes, it is not a straightforward instantiation of any conventional encryption or signature based challenge-response identification protocols. Therefore, we think it worthwhile to describe the protocol and analyze its security in detail.
1.V chooses r ∈ Z q uniformly at random and computes
ThenV sends x toP . 2. After receiving x,P rejects and stops if x q mod p = 1; otherwiseP computes z = h(x a mod p).
and sends z toV . 3. After receiving z,V verifies z. If z = h(v r mod p), thenV accepts; otherwise,V rejects.
Figure 2. Identification scheme description
Remark. The protocol can also be implemented in the setting of an elliptic curve E of prime order q, where q ≈ 2 160 . In this setting, the verification that x q mod p = 1 is unnecessary; it would suffice to verify that x is a point on E.
Security proof
Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption. In [1], Abdalla et al. proposed the Strong DiffieHellman (SDH) assumption. Let G be a group of prime order q, and let g be a generator of G. SDH, as well as the related Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) and Decisional Diffie-Hellman problems, are defined as follows:
• CDH problem: given a pair of elements (g a , g b ) from G, find the element C = g ab .
• DDH problem: given a triple of elements (g a , g b , g c ) from G, decide whether g c = g ab or not.
• SDH problem: given a pair of element (g a , g b ) from G, find the element C = g ab with the help of a restricted Decision Diffie-Hellman Oracle DDH g a (g b , g c ),
The SDH assumption says that, in the prime order group G, the SDH problem is intractable. SDH is a variant of Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) problem proposed by Okamoto and Pointcheval [8] .
Remark. Our definition of SDH is a slight extension of the SDH in [1] . We mandate that X ∈ G in the query DDH g a (X, Y ). Without this condition, the SDH assumption may no longer hold. For example, the adversary can choose r and query
. If the oracle returns 1, then the adversary learns that v is even. If the oracle returns 0, then the adversary learns that v is odd. Given such an oracle, more bits in v may be found by using the attack presented in [6] . This is often named a small subgroup attack in the literature.
Next we prove that the protocol is CR2 secure in the random oracle model if the SDH assumption holds. Proof. The CR2 security of the protocol is defined by Game 6, which is an instantiation of Game 5. Note that in Game 6, A has access to the hash function h() which is modelled as a random oracle. A may use the hash function to verify if r i = h(c i a ).
− → repeat steps 3. and 4. n times: 3.
Game 6:
We use Pr i [E] to indicate the probability that an event E occurs in game i. In Game 6, A wins the game with probability Pr 6 [r = h(c a )]. Now we transform Game 6 to Game 7 using the following changes:
• C receives g a and g e as input where a R ← − Z q and e R ← − Z q , and sets v = g a and c = g e .
• C is given a restricted DDH oracle DDH g a (·, ·).
• C maintains a table T . The rows of T consists of triples (x, y, h) such that y = x a and h = Hash(y), where Hash(·) is defined in Algorithm 3.3 and simulates a random oracle. Let X, Y, and H be the set of the elements in the three columns respectively. Initially, T contains one row (c, y, h c ) where y = ⊥ (⊥ denotes empty) and h c R ← − {0, 1} k .
• When A queries the hash function h(), C computes the hash value using Hash() in Algorithm 3.3.
• In step 4, C computes r i = Response(c i ) using Algorithm 3.2.
• In step 5, if r = h c , then C returns the y value in the initial row in T .
fill x in the same row as y in T return h } } add x to a new row of T fill in a random value for h and y = ⊥ in that row return h }
Algorithm 3.3. Hash(x)
If y ∈ Y return h in the same row in T Else{ For each pair (x, y) ∈ X × {y}{ If DDH v (x, y) = 1{ fill y in the same row as x in T return h from the same row } } add y to a new row in T fill in a random value for h and x = ⊥ in that row return h } In Game 7, C simulates a hash function to answer A's queries to the hash function. C makes consistent replies to identification challenges and hash queries throughout Game 7: when A queries h(v ri ), and challenges with g ri , it receives the same results. Therefore, Game 6 and Game 7 are identical to A, and it holds that
Suppose that, in step 5, A responds with r = h c . We show that only with negligible probability can A generate r = h c without querying the hash function h(y) with y = c a . We consider two cases: 1) if A generated r not by querying the hash function, then with negligible probability it holds that r = h c ; 2) if A generated r by querying h(y) where y = c a , then only with negligible probability it holds that C will return h c (this only happens in the case that h c appears in a row which does not contain c). Therefore, if A responds with r = h c , then with overwhelming probability, A queried h(y) where y = c a . It holds that Pr
where is negligible. Therefore,
[y = c a and r = h c ]
Therefore, if the SDH assumption holds, then the protocol is CR2 secure.
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We note that the above proof is similar to the proof in [1] , where Abdalla et al. gave results on the security of an ElGamal encryption variant named DHIES. In both proofs, the key steps are for the challengers C to simulate a hash function so that C's answers to hash queries are consistent with its answers in the protocol.
Equivalence of protocol security and SDH hardness
Next, we prove that the CR2 security of the protocol implies the hardness of the SDH problem. In the proof, we do not need to assume that the hash function h() is a random oracle. Instead, we only assume that h() is collision-free; i.e., that it is computationally infeasible to find x 1 and x 2 where x 1 = x 2 and h(x 1 ) = h(x 2 ). Collision-freeness is a standard assumption for cryptographic hash functions [10, §4.2].
Theorem 3.4. If the protocol is CR2 secure and the hash function h() is collision-free, then the SDH problem is hard.
Proof. We prove the theorem by showing that, if the SDH problem is not hard, then the protocol is not CR2 secure or we can find a collision for h.
Suppose that there is a polynomial time algorithm S that solves the SDH problem with non-negligible probability. We define the following Game 8. In Game 8, C and A run a game as defined in Game 6, where A acts as a cheating prover trying to cheat the challenger C. At the same time, A and S run a SDH game where A acts as a challenger to ask S to solve the SDH problem. In the SDH game, A sends (v = g a , c = g e ) to S, A answers DDH oracle queries DDH v (c i , y i ) from S, and S finally answers y = g ae . In the SDH game with S, A uses C to help answer the DDH oracle queries DDH v (c i , y i ) from S: if r i = h(y i ), then A decides that y i = c i a and answers with b = 1; if r i = h(y i ), then A decides that y i = c i a and answers with b = 0. If it happens that y i = c i a but h(y i ) = h(c i a ), then C finds a collision for h(). If this does not happen, then A always gives correct answers to the DDH oracle queries from S. Therefore, in step 5, S will output y such that y = c a with non-negligible probability, and C will accept with non-negligible probability as well.
We conclude that, if the SDH problem is easy, then C will either find a collision for h(), or it will accept in step 5, which means that the protocol is not CR2 secure. Combining Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.4, we conclude that the CR2 security of the protocol is equivalent to the hardness of the SDH problem.
Performance
We compare the performance of our scheme with the Stinson-Wu (SW) scheme in [11] . Assume, for all protocols, that k = 1024 and k = 160. The total message length is 2208 bits in the SW scheme, and 1184 bits in our scheme. Note however that a hash function can be used to compress the messages in the SW scheme (by hashing the 1024-bit response to 160 bits) so its message length can be reduced to 1344 bits.
In view of the number of exponentiations, the computational complexity of the two schemes is the same. Both the prover and verifier need two exponentiations, all with a 160-bit exponent. In the elliptic curve setting, provers in both schemes are required to perform only one "exponentiation" (i.e., a scalar multiple of a point on the elliptic curve).
Conclusion
In this paper, we discussed the security model for deterministic two-move identification protocols. With the deterministic provers in such protocols, we simplified the CR2 model in [2] which captures concurrent attacks and reset attacks. Then we proposed an extremely simple identification protocol and proved that its CR2 security is equivalent to the hardness of the Strong Diffie-Hellman problem.
